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THE TEACHING OF ECONOMICS
A RADICAL APPROACH TO ECONOMICS: BASIS FOR A
NEW CURRICULUM"
By RICHARDC . EDWARDS,
ARTHUR MACEWAN,and the
STAFF OF SOCIALSCIENCES125

Harvard University

The purpose of this paper is to outline a radical
approach to economics and to suggest how several
important social problems might be dealt with in
that framework. Our effort to develop a new curriculum is motivated by the conviction that the
orthodox approach to economics cannot deal with
the important problems of modern society.
Orthodox economic analysis as presented from
the elementary course through the graduate
seminar is based upon an acceptance of the status
quo in social relations. Microanalysis presupposes
the individualistic ownership and decision-making
systems typical of capitalist societies, and in this
narrow context the pecuniary behavior of firms
and individuals is examined. I n macroanalysis,
when the aggregate operations of these individual
units are the subject matter, attention is focused
on the fiscal and monetary adjustments necessary
to keep the system smoothly functioning. All in
all, the curriculum of modem economics is one
of philosophic marginalism: existing social relations are taken as a datum and the problem is one
of administering the system by adjustments
around the edges.
The marginalist approach is useful only if,
accepting the basic institutions of capitalism, one
*Social Sciences 125, "The Capitalist Economy:
Conflict and Power," is a course offered in the ~ e n e r a l
Education Program of Harvard College. We requested
that the course be "cross-listed" in the Department of
Economics so that it could count toward concentration
credit for economics majors. The Harvard Department
of Economics did not grant that request. The staff has
met on a weekly basis since the autumn of 1968 to work
out the substance of a radical approach to economics
and to form the course around that substance. The
ideas put forth in this paper are the products of the
group. Their expression here has been the responsibility
of Richard Edwards and Arthur MacEwan. Other
members of the group, which is about half faculty and
half teaching fellows, are: Keith Aufhauser, Peter
Bohmer. Roaer Bobmer. Samuel Bowles, Herbert
Gintis, Carl Gtsch, ~ t e p h a nMichelson, Ralph Pochoda, Patricia Quick* Michael Reich, and Thomas
Weiaskopf. We are grateful to Janice Weiss for help in
This is an abridged version. The full
editing the
text is available from the authors.

is
concerned with its administration.
If one questions the virtue of capitalism as a
system, then the basic social relations and the
institutions of the system themselves must be
subjected to analysis. A new approach is necessary.
The old approach-that which accepts capitalism and is in general the basis of present economics curricula-cannot deal with the problems
of modern society. All that the curricula say about
the war in Vietnam is how it can be financed more
efficiently. The very existence of imperialism is
denied. Racism, it is taught, has its origins in
personal preferences, and the poverty of blacks
and others is "explained" in terms of their low
productivity. The destruction of the environment
enters the curricula only as an aside when the
existence of "externalities" is pointed out as
limiting the theory. The subjugation of women,
the meaninglessness of work activities, and the
alienation of workers are topics which do not
enter the curricula a t all. Socialist alternatives and
the process of revolution are examined only in
terms of the value system of a capitalist environment.
I t is our contention that such issues-their
historical existence, causes, dynamics, and conseauences-should be central to a new economics
curriculum. This curriculum would reflect the
motif of modern American capitalism: conflict
and power. Attention would be focused upon the
basic economic institutions of capitalism and the
class divisions which those institutions foster.
I n Sections I1 and I11 we lay out a basic substantive argument for a radical approach to economics, which can be summarized as follows.
We begin with an analysis of the fundamental
capitalist institutions. These institutions function so as to limit the range of social outcomes
available; we show how the social problems mentioned above (income inequality,
alienation,
.
imperialism, and so forth) are directly attributable to the operation of these institutions. But
the basic institutions also confer power differentially, favoring those who already benefit from the
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economic system. Therefore, of the limited social
outcomes potentially available, there is a tendency
to choose those outcomes least conducive to a
decent society. We discuss (in Section 111) how
this power is exercised, particularly through the
state, in the service of class interests. I n Section
IV we conclude with some remarks about methods
of teaching. A statement on grading is included as
an appendix.

11. ConfEict, Power, and Institutions
The problems we have cited as providing the
motivation for a new economics curriculumimperialism, inequality, alienation, racism, etc.directly involve economic conflicts; that is, in
each case there are social groups with contradictory economic interests. Conflicts are decided
through the exercise of power and through the
operations of institutions. More precisely, power
-the ability of groups or individuals to resolve
conflicts in their favor-is not exercised in a
vacuum; rather it is always exercised within a
well-defined environment of economic institutions
which place strict limitations on its scope of operation.
For example, in the determination of wages in
a capitalist society, the institutional environment
narrowly confines the scope in which collective
bargaining, a process involving power, takes place.
First, the bargaining is predicated on the assumption that the struggle is one over distribution of
"excess profits"; that is, over what is left after all
the "costs" of production ("normal" profits and
socially unnecessary expenditures such as advertising, as well as socially necessary costs) have
been subtracted from total revenues. I n the
context of capitalism, the size of these costs is
nonnegotiable. Indeed, in the context of capitalism, it would likely be against the interests of the
workers involved to cut into these costs because
doing so might force the firm out of business.
Second, once a negotiated agreement regarding
wages has been reached, it can often be vitiated by
price increases. Thus, both before and after its
operation, power in the bargaining situation is
severely constrained by the institutions of the
system.
One hypothesis which lies a t the core of a
radical approach to economics is that basic economic institutions to a large extent determine the
nature of social relations and the outcomes of
social conflict processes; that is, social decision
making is largely organized and effected through
the basic economic institutions. This hypothesis
involves two questions. First, to what extent do
institutions directly determine social relations
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and the outcomes of social conflict processes?
Second, to what extent is the distribution of
power among groups and individuals determined
by the structure of institutions?
I n considering the role of capitalist institutions,
we emphasize as basic (that is, system-defining)
institutions the following:' the market in labor,
in which labor is treated as a commodity and
allocated on the basis of the highest bidder; control of the work process by those who own and
control capital,' including the concomitant loss of
control by the worker over his activities during
the hours of work; the legal relations of ownership, by which income distribution is determined
through payments to owners for the use of their
productive factors; homo economicus, the system
of personality traits characteristic of and functional to capitalism, including especially the
system of individual gain incentives; and the
ideology which abstracts and organizes "reality"
in such a way as to justify and facilitate the operation of the other institutions.
These institutions create several of the social
problems we have mentioned: income inequality,
alienation, destruction of the environment, and
imperialism. Furthermore, racism and the subjugation of women become functional in a society
organized by these institutions. The arguments we
shall suggest next are intended to make explicit
the links between the operation of capitalist
institutions and these problems.
The Consequences of Capitalist Institzctions:
Income Inequality. Tendencies toward inequality
are an integral part of the functioning of capitalist
institutions. Consider first the consequences of a
market in labor. I n order to insure that the vast
majority of workers will sell their labor power on
the market, it is important that workers not have
the option to work for themselves; that is, it is
necessary that workers own no factors of production other than their own labor [38, VIII] [49].
As a result, capital ownership must be concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number
of nonworkers. Furthermore, as long as material
rewards are the main motivation for work, the
incentive structure required to induce workers to
acquire and apply productive skills must be char1 See Polanyi in Dalton 1141, [IS] 1371 for discussions
of the operation of capitalist institutions and their
development.
While "owners" and "controllers" are not necessarily the same persons, as a group they define the
goals of the capitalist firm to be profit maximization; on
this point Bee Baran and Sweezy [3] and Solow [52]
who counter Galbraith (211. All we require here is that
firms "approximately" maximize profits, or that they do
so in the "long run."
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acterized by significant inequalities in labor
earnings.$
The capitalist's side of the production process
makes similar demands. First, substantial reward
differences are needed in order to induce entrepreneurs to perform their social functions as
innovators, production organizers, and risktakers. Second, given economies of scale in production (either technological or those deriving
simply from market power, etc.) and given the
institutional association between capital ownership and control of the productive process, concentration of ownership necessarily develops.
Finally, profit maximization leads to a rapid
rate of technological change. I n a market setting,
the capacity to exploit profitable innovations
depends on the ability to raise the necessary capital. Once inequalities begin to develop (or given
historic inequalities), this ability is unequally
distributed. As a result, the rewards of technological change, which are often considerable, tend
to be distributed to those who are already a t the
top of the income distribution, lending a further
tendency away from equality [SO]. The above
tendencies of technological progress operate even
in the absence of biases which directly reduce the
labor share of income in the choice of capital- or
labor-saving technology. I n a society with more or
less competitive factor markets but with collective
control by capitalists over research and development, it can easily be shown that the selection of
the pattern of technological progress will be to the
disadvantage of labor.
These tendencies toward inequality derive
directly from the fundamental institutions. We
would not argue, however, that the distribution of
Inequalities in conjunction with personal material
incentives exist in some socialist societies as well as in
societies. Meade [41] explains the dual role
of prices in a market economy, pointing out that prices
which lead to efficient allocation may yield a very undesirable income distribution.

income is entirely determined by the operation of
capitalist institutions. Income determination isperhaps above all else-a struggle. One of the
principal aspects of this struggle is the effort by
groups to increase the prices of the factors they
own. Thus, the income struggle can be viewed as
a class struggle, where classes are defined in terms
of their relation to the means of production.
Alienatiolz. The leisure-labor dichotomy characteristic of neoclassical economic analysis reflects
an acceptance of the notion that in general, labor
or work activities will be nonfulfdling drudgery
undertaken to secure an income, and that creative activities leading to individual development
must necessarily be nonwork ("leisure") activities. There is considerable anthropological evidence that this division of life is historically
specific to labor-market societies, and that productive activities have not always been separated
from creative, developmental ones [14, pp. 19251.
Within capitalist society, the capitalist's control of the work process means that the workersthat is, those who sell their labor on a marketdo not determine the technological or social organization of the work process; likewise, they do not
determine what product will be produced or what
the product will be used for. Thus, the worker is
separated or alienated from both his work activities and his product. Likewise, since labor power
cannot be separated from the laborer himself,
control by the capitalist of the worker's labor
carries with i t control of the worker's life during
the work day.*
Under these circumstances, work activities are
Marx 1391 provides the classical statement of the
process of alienation. Readings based on the more
modern situation include [22] [I21 [6] [28] [20].
6 More generally, insofar as a trade-off exists between the quality of the work process and maximum
profits, in capitalist society the former will always be
sacrificed to the latter. This situation is illustrated
graphically below.

profitability

Uc: Capitalists' preferences
UW:Workers' preferences
P: Capitalists' equilibrium
Q: Workers' equilibrium
Uw
quality of
work
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in general neither creative nor self-developmental.5 The worker has no intrinsic interest in
either his direct activities or their goal, and motivation must then take the form of working for the
extrinsic incentive of wages. As pointed out above,
for wage incentives to be effective, considerable
inequality (and therefore considerable reward for
working properly) must exist.
But solving the problem of motivation in an
alienated work environment is not left to wages
(and the requisite wage inequality) alone. I n
modern capitalist societies, the United States in
particular, the educational system serves the function of preparing workers for the conditions of
their employment. The educational system disciplines the work force.
Most people on the job find little use for those
cognitive abilities acquired in school, other than
the most elementary ones (the "three R's"), or,
insofar as they do, they could just as well have
learned these abilities on the job. On the other
hand, coming on time, following directions and
learning to respect authority, learning to work for
external incentives (grades), and budgeting time
are modes of behavior, affective traits, which the
school instills and the job requires. Thus the
schools prepare, by experience, their students to
function effectively in an alienated environment?
The consequences of alienation are obviously
very great. When the organization and purpose of
one's major life role--i.e., work-are externally
controlled and motivated, that role and life
itself tend to become meaningless. Character
development and self-expression are distorted
and stiiled by the work environment and achieve
only stunted realization through nonwork activities. Cynicism-towards oneself, towards others,
and towards society-tends to be the result.
The worker's alienation can be viewed as a
fragmentation of his existence: his working hours
are not controlled (arranged, organized, or motivated) by him and are therefore fragmented from

I

Of course, in a society where workers' preferences
dominated, the transformation locus might look very
different, due both to a different motivational orientation of workers and conscious development of new
technologies consonant with higher quality work.
6 More on this argument, especially with regard to
the role of grades, is provided in the appendix. Useful
readings concerning the function of schools include [24]
[48] [27] [19]. I t should be noted that what has been
said about alienation and education in the capitalist
environment could also be true in other modern, highly
bureaucratized and organized societies. Thus, while the
elimination of capitalism is a necessary condition for
the elimination of this problem, i t is not a sufficient
condition. On the personality requirements of bureaucracy, see [22] [42].

the rest of his existence. His family, his recreation, his intellectual activity are not integrated
with work activity which dominates his life.?
Furthermore, even his work activities are fragmented: capitalist production drives towards a
technology with an ever finer division of labor,
so the worker cannot even participate in production of a complete product.
Alienation is not a "cost" to workers which can
be recouped through a higher supply price of
labor. I n the first place, workers are not able to
extract higher wages as "compensation" because
there are few if any meaningful nonalienating
alternatives available to them; that is, alienation
is pervasive throughout the capitalist economy.
Furthermore, insofar as a variety of work conditions does exist, stratification of labor markets
insures that persons in alienating work environments have only similar environments as alternatives (a bureaucrat typically does not have the
option of becoming a doctor). Also, the lack of
creative, self-developmental work activities insures that workers will not demand such a work
environment: their preferences (like everyone
else's) are molded by their environment, and the
absence of nonalienating alternatives allows
workers no basis on which to change their preferences.
Destruction of the Environment. Capitalism is
usually credited-by
Marx, Schumpeter, and
many others-as being a system which attains
maximum output expansion from a given resource
base. Markets and homo economicus prove to be
powerful tools for organizing an economy towards
growth. The ideology of capitalism, in turn, places
high value on the rise of material output.
The acceptance of aggregate output per se as
an indicator of welfare, however, would be a t best
a questionable procedure. The prices a t which
aggregate output is valued are reflections of the
existing distribution of income and the preferences engendered by the system. They therefore
cannot be endowed with any objective welfare
meaning. Furthermore, the very process of output expansion has consequences outside of the
market which are detrimental to social welfare.
The capitalist growth process has historically
involved the fracture of community. This process
takes many forms, including current phenomena:
traditional, nonalienating work processes are
destroyed by competition with modern industry;
agricultural communities are decimated by the
On the issue of fragmentation of life, see readings
listed in the preceding footnote as well a s Polanyi in
[14] and [29, especially pp. 243-681.

AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
introduction of new technology; cities grow and
decay depending upon the vagaries of the market;
urban inhabitants experience anomie because
their communities are functionally fragmented.
Community is not a good which can be produced
for market sale.
Because the capitalist controls the work process
and his goal is profit maximization, there will be
no tendency to minimize costs which fall on
others. Indeed, for any given level of costs, there
will be an effort to maximize the share of costs
borne by others. These extramarket costs take the
form of fracture of the community, water and air
pollution, congestion, "urban sprawl," etc.-a
general destruction of the environment which
cannot be viewed as a secondary issue but one of
dominant importance in the society. Furthermore,
capitalists' efforts to choose technology and to
organize production so as to minimize their own,
but not social, costs insures that the importance
of the problem increases over time. (The rich are
often able to protect themselves from pollution,
by zoning for example.) Thus the rise in concern
regarding problems of pollution is in no way
surprising, nor should i t be surprising that antipollution groups make headway only when the
problems become severe. To halt the destruction
of the environment, i t would be necessary to restrict seriously the operation of basic capitalist
institutions. Thus human needs become subordinated to the needs of the market and to capital
expansion.
Imperialism.Subordination of human needs to
the needs of capital expansion has been a pervasive characteristic of capitalist growth, and this
process has been carried out, not only domestically, but also on an international scale. The geographic spread of capitalism derives from the
operations of its basic institutions. First, the
individual gain rationale of capitalism leads constantly in search of new sources of profits. For the
firm, continued well-being depends upon finding
new, profitable uses for its previously accrued
profits. Second, the opportunities for assuring the
availability of such investment opportunities are
greater, the greater is the geographic scope of the
system.
The spreading of the system has been a characteristic of capitalism throughout its history.
I t has involved breaking down the restrictions on
the operation of the market, on the capitalist control of the work process, and on the system of individual gain. Earlier, the problem was one of
creating nations and then spheres of influence.
Today, when one capitalist nation has become
dominant, the problem is one of integrating an
international capitalist system. This integration

means a t a minimum that the nefarious aspects of
capitalism-inequality, alienation, destruction of
environment-are spread, or, insofar as they
already exist, they are maintained. However,
because this integration takes place under the
dominance of the business interests of an advanced capitalist nation, the output expansion
capacity of capitalism is not necessarily transmitted to the poorer countries. First, simply the
operation of comparative advantage which
operates in an integrated capitalist system would
inhibit industrialization and growth in poor
countries. Second, the monopolistic conditions
of business in the United States allow even less
opportunity for development in poor countries.
Because of its power, which operates both within
and outside the market, U.S. business (or business
from other advanced capitalist nations) is able
to preempt investment opportunities and inhibit
the development of a historically progressive
industrial bourgeoisie in the poor countries.
Finally, the interests of international capital require the maintenance of a "favorable investment
climate" and so the state power of advanced
countries is used to prevent radical political and
social change in poor c o u n t r i e ~ . ~
Racism. Racism in the United States can be
seen as functionally supportive of the interests of
capital. I n our discussion of alienation, we asserted that the segmentation and stratification of
the labor force is one mechanism by which labor is
prevented from obtaining a higher wage for undertaking less desirable jobs. Black people clearly
comprise one of the most oppressed segments of
the labor force in the United States. They are
restricted to the most undesirable jobs and they
are paid the lowest wages.
I t is often alleged that white workers benefit
from racism and that the losers are the capitalists
who are prevented by racism from hiring blacks.
Such an allegation is true, if a t all, only in the
static sense when total labor income is b e d . The
division of the labor force by race, however,
weakens the position of workers as a group, and
their share of income is consequently reduced.
Demands by white workers are attenuated by the
threat of being replaced by workers from the black
labor po01.~
a Useful references putting forth the radical analysis
of imperialism include [56] [36] [la] [2] [32]. On the
history of U.S.imperialism, see [31] (611 [47].
9 Michael Reich, in his investigation of the relationship between racism and class divisions, has found that
racial inequality between blacks and whites (as measured by the difference between white and nonwhite
median incomes) is significantly and positively related
to class inequality among whites (as measured by the
Gini coefficient for white incomes). See [53, Chap. VII
and passim].
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Furthermore, antagonisms of white workers are
directed by racism towards blacks rather than
towards employers; that is, institutionalized
racism dilutes awareness of class divisions. When
the animosity of white workers is directed against
blacks, the white workers see themselves as having a stake in the system-they are not a t the bottom.
The Subjugation o f Women. The segmentation
of the labor force, of course, involves many divisions other than race. Extensive division by
"skill" and education categories is of obvious
importance. The division by sex and the concomitant subjugation of women pervade the entire
society. I n this paper we will only point out that
there are many parallels to racism, and the points
we have made above, especially those regarding
the functional role of stratitication in allowing low
wages to be paid for undesirable work, are again
relevant. Indeed, for most of their labor, namely,
housework, women receive no wages as such and
have very little choice in the matter [46] [S].
Summary. I n this section we have suggested
arguments regarding the relationship between
important social problems and the institutions of
a capitalist society. We believe that the general
analysis forms a basic component in a radical
approach to economics. The points we would like
to emphasize in summary are the following:
1. The negative characteristics which we have
ascribed to capitalism are completely compatible
with successful, rapid expansion of output. Indeed, it is in the very process of yielding a maximum output (maximum profit) situation that
the institutions of capitalism yield income inequality and alienation, for example. Thus, the
analysis is only in small part based upon the occurrence of business cycles, unemployment, etc.
I n essence, the critique is fully applicable when
the capitalist economy is in boom. And however
one may value output versus other variables
which contribute to welfare, it seems obvious that
the greater the output, the less valuable it is
relative to the other variables. Thus a capitalist
society becomes increasingly less tolerable.
2. The core institutions of capitalism interact
in such a way as to determine social relations and
circumscribe the outcomes of conflict situations.
First, these institutions work in a parallel fashion
to produce a class society. Reliance on individual
gain incentives, capitalist control of the production process, and the legal relations of ownership
insure that capitalist development will produce
division into classes. Second, the core institutions
are highly interdependent in that they sustain
and facilitate the operation of each other; the
functional interrelations are such that severe

alteration of any one is incompatible with maintaining the others.
3. The acceptance of capitalist institutions
carries with i t certain constraints on the functioning of the society. These constraints usually take
the form of conflicts between alternative social
needs. For example, the trade-off between output
growth and income equality exists within the
context of capitalism. The trade-off is created by
the functional requisites of the institutions. But
we can easily imagine a society in which such a
trade-off would not exist. Such would be the case
if men worked because they cared for and felt on
equal terms with the entire community rather
than if they worked for direct personal gain. Other
examples of such generally accepted trade-offs,
which are artifacts of capitalism, include income
growth versus a meaningful work environment,
employment versus stable prices, private versus
social costs, public versus private consumption,
and income versus leisure.
4. The core capitalist institutions tend to subordinate other institutions to serve their needs.
We have illustrated with the case of education
(other examples would be the family and religion)
how other institutions serve the needs of the
economy. I n this sense, capitalism may be characterized as an "economic society."
There are, of course, limits to the extent to
which capitalist institutions shape society, and a
curriculum based only on the argument to this
point would certainly be deficient. Thus, we now
turn to a consideration of the exercise of powerin particular, the role of the state-in the context
of capitalist institutions.

111. The Exercise o j Power
Class Divisions i n Capitalist Society. As we have
noted, the development and operation of capitalist institutions divides society into classes. First,
class division is a prerequisite for the effective
organization of the institutions: most of the population must be reduced to worker status while
simultaneously a capitalist elite is created and its
existence justified. Second, the basic institutions
function so as to augment the wealth, power, and
privilege of that elite.
The analysis of economic institutions which
leads to these conclusions provides a basis for
examining the exercise of power-the ability of
groups to resolve the outcomes of social conflict
processes in their own favor. First, the analysis
provides the working hypothesis that economic
organization is the basis of power. Second, the
analysis emphasizes that the different classes have
conflicting interests with regard to the maintenance of the existing social relations. Together,
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these statements would lead us to hypothesize
that power in a capitalist society is dominated by
the capitalist class, and since social conilict may
lead to instability in the institutions themselves,
the class exercises power primarily to maintain
the institutions which function in its favor. The
intervention of power-to deflect political threats,
depoliticize class conflict, and so forth-assures
the smooth functioning of ~apitalism?~
The Operation o j Ruling Class Power-The
State. An example of the interaction between the
operation of institutions and the exercise of power
is provided by the recent history of welfare programs. As we have pointed out in Section 11, an
unequal income distribution results from the
functioning of the labor market, the system of
individual gain incentives, and the linking of income to ownership and sale of productive factors.
There are, however, several secondary forces
which exacerbate inequality, and the reality of
capitalism is even worse than the model. First,
there are many family units which own no salable
labor or other factors of production: the sick, the
aged, the disabled. Second, there are those who
own labor power but who are discriminated
against in the labor market: blacks, other nonwhites, and women. Third, income inequalities
are exacerbated by unequal access to activities
through which labor quality is "improved" (e.g.,
schooling and apprenticeship). Fourth, unemployment is always present in a capitalist system,
and its incidence falls heaviest on the groups
already a t the bottom of the income ladder."
This situation poses a threat to capitalism.
10 While we argue that power is dominated by the
capitalist class, that is not to say that it monopolizes
power or that its rule is unrestricted. Furthermore,
capitalists need not monopolize decision-making positions nor must they operate according to an articulated
schema in order to be dominant. The existence of an
ideology which favors capitalist interests and a sufficiently pervasive common set of objective self-interests
among capitalists serves to assure that decisions will be
in their favor. I t is in this sense that we can identify the
capitalist class as a ruling class. The dichotomous division of society into workers and capitalists obviously
involves a simplification. Other groups (e.g., highly
paid professionals, land-owning farmers, etc.) exist who
cannot readily be identified directly with either class.
However, we use the term "worker" broadly to identify
all who sell their labor power on a market and therefore
the class categories extend to most of the population.
Furthermore, our preceding analysis of capitalist institutions and our analysis below of the exercise of
power lead us to the conclusion that these are the most
important groups to study for understanding social
change. On the American ruling class, see (54, Chap.
91 [45] [16]; on the nature of classes, see [57] 181 [4].
11 Miller [44] provides a good description of these
secondary forces. For a left critique of Miller, see [30].

Those affected have no stake in maintaining the
system and become unruly. The preservation of
capitalism requires that the misery of poverty be
alleviated, or a t least that something be done
about its appearance. Yet an attack on the basic
causes of the problem, the functioning of the basic
economic institutions, is ruled out. For example,
an adequate welfare program would interfere with
work incentives; it would conflict with the principle that income is a payment for productive
factors. Therefore, political power is focused on
the secondary factors and symptoms, but the
basic processes remain unaffected. Old age pension programs are established; equal opportunity
employment regulations are legislated; manpower training programs are set up; unemployment compensation schemes are developed. Even
if such programs were successful on their own
terms, they could eliminate only the most severe
aspects of inequality and poverty. I n fact, most
of these programs fail to achieve their own modest
objectives.
Opposition to system-preserving welfare programs derives not only from their conflict with
the institutions. Often, interest groups within the
capitalist class or powerful professional groups are
hurt by welfare legislation. Thus, the A.M.A.
battles against medical care; housing developers
oppose public housing programs and city planning; the automobile companies work to keep
public transit facilities inadequate; textile employers subvert equal employment opportunity
legislation. These are cases where class interests
and self-interest seem to conflict. While the ruling
class as a whole would benefit by establishing an
ameliorative program and thereby securing its
position, some of its members would be hurt. Thus
because ruling class solidarity (see below) is a t
least as important for the preservation of that
system as is preventing disruption by the poor,
inadequate welfare programs are the outcome.
Welfare programs are but one example of
ruling-class functioning-taking action, compromising within itself, absorbing discontentcarried out through the state. Other revealing
examples are public education, tariff policies,
financing of research programs, agriculture and
transportation subsidies, and the structure of
taxation. We believe that these operations of the
state are best understood if the state is viewed as
basically operating in the interests of the capitalist class.la
12 Sweezy [55, Chap. 131 provides a good statement
of this view of the state. The classic argument is provided by Lenin [33, especially Part I] [34].
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The Priorities of the State. If, as according to our
hypothesis, the state is dominated by the capitalist class, then the operations of the state should
reflect the needs of the capitalist class. I n modern
capitalist states, when the basic institutions have
been thoroughly established, the maintenance
and preservation of these institutions upon which
the structure of class and privilege depends is of
the greatest importance to the capitalist class.
The uninhibited operation of the economic institutions will continue to bestow power, wealth,
and prestige upon the capitalists. They do not
need the state to enhance their position, only to
assure it.
The system-preserving function of the state is
evident in several areas. A continued threat to
capitalism has been the failure of the economy
autonomously to generate adequate aggregate
demand. This failure has brought recurring crises
with substantial unemployment. I n spite of once
seemingly inviolable ideological objections to the
contrary, the state has assumed the function of
demand regulator. Such regulation does not eliminate unemployment, but simply reduces it to levels
which are not system threatening.
A second system-preserving function of the
state has been its decisive role in obfuscation and
suppression of class conflict. This is accomplished
through suppressing system-threatening groups
(e.g., the Wobblies, Black Panthers), by deflecting their demands for structural changes into
acceptable material demands (e.g., labor union
economism, black capitalism), or through ameliorative programs. If we may modify the jargon
of public finance, state actions such as suppression
or amelioration may be viewed as "class goods."
When the challenge posed by workers becomes
severe, no single capitalist can protect himself.
Were he to give concessions to his workers, his
competitive position would be endangered. To
employ private armies has been possible but
highly inefficient. Thus, action by the capitalists
as a class is necessary.
The enormous military establishment provides
another example of system-preserving state operations; as such, it performs a dual function. First,
it provides the rationale for huge expenditures
which serve to maintain aggregate demand without threatening the security or position of any
group in the ruling class. For example, social welfare measures often do threaten such groups.
Second, as the capitalist system becomes increasingly an international system, the military directly
protects the far-flung parts of that system
,7
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The response of the state to changes in the

process of production which require more highly
developed labor, illustrates a second priority of
the state; namely, the creation of new institutions. The rise of mass education in the United
States has occurred in response to the need by
industry for a skilled work force?s Because workers are not tied to particular employment, individual capitalists cannot invest in the general
training of workers and expect to appropriate the
returns. Thus, capitalists turn to the state to
provide a skilled work force. When education is
handled by the state and portrayed as social welfare, it is paid for by general tax revenue rather
than by the capitalists themselves [35, Chap. 31
[511 [431 [gl 1601.
The structure of the educational system betrays
its class-oriented genesis. Mass education in the
United States covers a vast quality range, and a
positive association has been established between
parents' incomes or class and the quality of public
education which children receive. If, as seems
reasonable, the benefits of education are correlated with the quality of that education, then the
class bias of U.S. education is obvious. Thus the
educational system operates to reinforce the class
bias of the core economic institutions."
There is a further aspect of the educational
function which reveals its class bias; namely, its
role in transmitting ideology. Students are taught
a view of society which justifies the status quo
and which poses efforts for change as unnecessary
or futile.
The primacy of the roles of the state in preserving the system and in developing new institutions
to meet changing circumstances should not obscure the fact that the state also intervenes diSee, for example, [ l l ] [13,.pp. 23-57].
The relationship between inequalities in schooling
and inequalities in the totaI income distribution may be
expressed as follows. Let Y represent individual income,
K represent earnings from capital, and L represent
earnings from labor. If we let the variance of Y over the
mean Y represent our measure of income inequality, it
can easily be seen that
1'
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Y

On the plausible assumption that most of the inequalities in labor earnings are due to inequalities in skills,
education, and the general socialization process, we see
that inequalities in schooling may contribute to income
inequality, even where school inequalities are not associated with inequalities in capital ownership. However,
note that the last term on the right-hand side of the
above expression represents the contribution to total
income inequality of the degree to which inequalities
in capital earnings are associated with inequalities in
labor earnings. Given the social class inequalities of our
educational system, we expect the covariance term to
be positive.
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rectly in the economy to benefit immediate interests of capitalists. The most significant realmin quantitative terms-where the state intervenes
is in military and space spending, which we
discussed above.16
Another example of direct intervention, one
which illustrates the case particularly well, is the
government's relation to the agricultural sector.
The general picture of what has happened in agriculture is well known. Wages in agriculture have
remained low and unemployment high. Subsistence farmers have been unable to survive. The
rural poor have been forced into the urban
ghettos, supplying the low-cost labor force for
industrial expansion. All the while, large farmers
have received subsidies, price supports, and protection [I].
Furthermore, the very process which creates
the agricultural problem is exacerbated by government programs. Government expenditure on
agricultural research and extension has played a
signscant role in raising agricultural productivity a t a more rapid rate than general productivity and has thereby contributed to the massdislocation of rural workers and subsistence
farmers. Those statistical studies which are available confirm casual empiricism: the overall impact
of the government in its agricultural programs
has been to increase inequality within the agricultural sector [7] [lo].
The point is, however, not only that the process
has worked toward increasing inequality but that
it is the large owners of property-of the agricultural means of production-who benefit. Their
benefit is derived directly from the programs
which have been developed for "helping agriculture." Payment for unused land is of no help to
rural laborers. Price supports for marketable
surplus is of no help to subsistence farmers. Government subsidies for capital-augmenting technical change have the same class bias.
Military spending, agricultural subsidies, and
other such programs provide ample ammunition
for the muckraker. However, in terms of their
importance in the overall operations of the state,
we believe they are not of highest priority. Their
position is behind the system-preserving and
secondary-institutions-creating roles of the state.
Nonetheless, when studied as a group, these actions of the state which directly enhance the
privilege of the capitalist class reveal the basic
character of the state in a capitalist society and
provide a useful starting point for the analysis
of p o ~ e r . ' ~
18 For a documentation of the subsidies provided to
military contractors, see [59] and Joint Economic Committee (1969).

Cohesiolt of the Ruling Class. The term "ruling
class" may evoke the image of a small, conspiratorial group which coldly calculates the oppression of the poor and its own gain. The actual
functioning of the capitalist ruling class in the
United States cannot, however, be well understood in such terms.
A class operates as a class in a number of ways.
First, the class can be conscious of itself as a
group with common objective interests, and can
function cohesively on the basis of that consciousness. Second, the class can hold in common a
value system or ideology which justifies the class's
position and serves as a guide to action. Third,
the class can coalesce on specific issues which
serve the interests of some of its members if the
favor is returned when the special interests of
other members are a t issue.
I n general, it is difficult to distinguish which of
these three mechanisms is a t work a t any given
time. I n the case of the United States, all three
mechanisms operate. For example, elite schools,
class-segregated neighborhoods, and social clubs
tend to instill in ruling class members a sense of
identity and of their separateness from the rest of
society. Thus, they become aware of their special
stake in the status quo social relations and consciously work for the stability of the system.
Obviously, if aware of their own position and if
working toward a common goal, the members of
the ruling class need not "conspire" to assure
behavior in their common interest.
On the other hand, the very strong capitalist
ideology in the United States tends to make class
consciousnessper se less important. A set of values
that justify the position of the capitalist class, the
basic institutions of capitalism, and the status quo
in general provides a guide to action. Indeed, the
prevalence of the capitalist ideology not only
assures common action by members of the capitalist class but means that others will cooperate to
serve capitalist interests above their own. This
is the case, for example, when white workers
accept racism and reject a working-class consciousness.
On many issues, logrolling furthers the class
interest. This occurs when each group within the
capitalist class structures its own policies so that
they do not come into c o d i c t with other groups
within the class, expecting (and receiving) such
cooperation in return.
16 I t would be consistent with this theory if the state
were to take some actions which, in terms of their direct
impact, increased income equality, provided these actions could be interpreted as serving the stability of the
system. Lenin [33] analyzes the ten-hour day legislation
in these terms.
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These mechanisms which tie a class together
should not be confused with the objective identity
of the class itself. T h e capitalist class in the
United States is a ruling class. T h e degree to
which it has consciousness, a strong ideology, and
internal cooperation determines how successfully
it can rule."

I

IV. On Teaching and Practice
So far we have limited our discussion to the
content of a radical course. Radical substance,
however, is only part of a radical approach to
economics. First, college and university teachers
work in one of the centers of radical social activity
in the United States. Radical teachers should,
therefore, view their own work as part of a wider
radical movement. They should design their
courses to be relevant to the concerns and needs
of that movement. Furthermore, radical economists cannot be isolated as academics. Only by
taking part in the activities of the radical movement can they integrate their scholarly work with
the concerns of the movement.
Second, teaching style is also relevant to the
radical approach. I n Section I1 we suggested the
argument that one of the functions of the educational system in the United States is to prepare
students for the authoritarian and repressive
' 1 Readers of this paper may well ask to what extent
we consider our approach Marxist. The following
quotation seems relevant:
When asked whether or not we are M a d s t , our
position is the same as that of a physicist or a biologist
when asked if he is a 'Newtonian' or if he is a 'Pasteurian.'
"There are truths so evident, so much a part of people's
knowledge, that it is now useless to discuss them. One
ought to be 'Marxist' with the same naturalness with
which one is 'Newtonian' in Physics, or 'Pasteurian' in
biology, considering that if facts determine new concepts, these new concepts will never divest themselves
of that portion of truth possessed by the older concepts
they have outdated. Such is the case, for example, of
Einsteinian relativity or Planck's 'quantum' theory
with respect to the discoveries of Newton; they take
nothing at all away from the greatness of the learned
Englishman. Thanks to Newton, physics was able to
advance until it had achieved new concepts in space.
The learned Englishman provided the necessary steppingstones for them.
"The advances in social and political science, as in other
fields, belong to a long historical process whose links
are connecting, adding up, molding and constantly
perfecting themselves. .
"The merit of Marx is that he suddenly produces a
qualitative change in the history of social thought. He
interprets history, understands its dynamic, predicts
the future, but in addition to predicting i t (which would
satisfy his scientific obligation) he expresses a revolutionary concept: the world must not only be interpreted, it must be transformed." The statement is by
Ernesto "Che" Guevara [25].
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conditions of the work place. Obviously radicals
cannot allow themselves to be part of such a
socializing process. It is necessary for our own
liberation as well as for the students' welfare to
break down authoritarian relations in the classroom. The function of lectures, for example, in
which one person talks a t a mass of students, is,
in general, antithetical to radical teaching. Likewise, radical teachers should challenge the grading
system and the role which grades play in providing a n external incentive analogous to and preparatory for the wage system (see Appendix).
I n other words, teaching with a radical approach to economics is not simply a matter of
putting forth a certain interpretation of United
States capitalism. A radical approach cames with
it certain lessons for change--lessons which must
be followed in our teaching of economics.

Skrlemnt on Grading by the Staff of Social
Sciences 125 lo the Committee on
Educational Policy*
Grades serve a number of functions: they establish a
system of incentives for students, they structure the
nature of social relations in the educational process,
and they provide needed information within and outside the university. We argue that the incentive function of grades and their effect on classroom relations are
inimical to learning. Furthermore, we believe that the
informational role of grades could be served through
alternative mechanisms which would promote rather
than hinder learning.
Incentives. Learning should take place for desirable
social ends and for the intrinsic enjoyment of learning.
The grading process establishes an undesirable reward
structure in which obtaining a high grade becomes the
motivational force. The indirect reward of a good grade
replaces the direct satisfaction from the process of
learning or the resulting knowledge as the final objective of many students. Such an incentive structure is
undesirable in and of itself.
However, the role of grades in educational institutions cannot be fully understood as long as attention is
conhed to the universities alone. Grades function to
socialize students into the work force. On a job, workers
do not obtain satisfaction from an intrinsic interest
either in the process of production or in the resulting
product of their work. Nor do they obtain satisfaction
from the social usefulness of the product. Instead, they
are motivated by the prospect of an external rewardwages received in exchange for labor powers. In the
workplace, the need to substitute external incentives
for intrinsic interest arises because of the separation of

The petition which follows was submitted to the
Committee on Educational Policy of Haward University by the Staff of Social Sciences 125 during the
first term in which the course was offered. The petition
was rejected.
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the workers from control over the production process
and its products. Grades play an important role in preparing young people for thii kind of work environment.
We object to both an economic system and an educational system which operate in this manner.
The content of the knowledge acquired by a student
is also affected by grades. Those aspects of any subject
matter which can most easily be reduced to a single onedimensional measure increase in importance-such as,
for example, factual and quantifiable data. In the
choice of paper topics, preference is given to small
questions which can be easily researched and for which
a complete answer can be developed in the limited time
available. In order to assure a short-run payoff, the student tends to minimize risk by restricting hi field of
inquiry. As a result, the larger framework and context
of hi studies is taken for granted. Thus grades play
a significant role in the perpetuation of the status quo
in social inquiry. To this we object.
Structure of Classroom Social Relations. The power
to give grades provides professors with a sanction for the
exercise of authority in the educational process. Grades
promote acquiescence and conformity among students
and exempt teachers from the necessity of being relevant, interesting, and well prepared in their classes.
Students refrain from criticizing mediocrity and dullness in part because of the fear of jeopardizing their
grades and in part because the process of grading has
diverted attention away from learning itself. (We do
not raise here the possibility that grades inspire political
conformity between students and professors.) In general, the authoritarian relationship between teachers and
students in the classroom is inimical to learning, and
for this reason too we oppose grades.
Information. The principal external consumers of the
information contained in grades are employers and
graduate schools, who need to identify the students
they most prefer and the ones they least prefer. Grades
provide employers and graduate schools with a costless
means of ranking students for their own purposes. But
education should not be made subservient to their
needs, particularly since grades interfere with the
learning process. Graduate schools and employers could
devise their own mechanisms of evaluation and selection if students were not graded, as already happens
with students from a number of colleges, such as
Antioch, which do not grade.
Grades are also used to fill informationalneeds within
the university. Students use grades to obtain feedback
from their instructors on performance in class. Faculty
members use grades from previous courses as guidelines for admitting students to their own courses. The
administration uses grades in allocating financial aid.
Although we object to this last use of grades, we do
feel that information on student performance can be
useful both to the student and to the teacher in the
educational process. The use of a summary letter grade
is simply not the best means for fulfilling such informational needs.
For a11 these reasons, we find the grading process abhorrent, and we intend to substitute other mechanisms
to perform those functions of grades that we feel

should be retained. In our course we will prepare written
evaluations of each student's work. The evaluation will
be available to the student and to others if the student
so requests. Further, we plan to arrange individual
meetings between student and instructor during the
semester. Finally, the organization of the course into
small sections automatically provides continuous feedback to the students.
Therefore, we petition the Committee on Educational
Policy to remove the grading requirement from our
course. Further, we ask for a public hearing with the
C.E.P. concerning both our petition and the general
role of grades a t Harvard. We would like to raise a t
that point the arguments for the complete elimination
of grades from the Harvard educational process.
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